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We propose a reverse uniform price auction called Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism (CRAM) that integrates both monetary and non-monetary incentives (NMIs). 
CRAM computes the cash bonus and NMIs to a single cost parameter, retains the lowest 
cost employees and provides them with compensation equal to the cost of the first 
excluded employee. CRAM is dominant strategy incentive compatible. We provide 
optimal bidding strategy, and show that there is cost saving compared to a benchmark 
auction (monetary retention auction). Because CRAM and the benchmark may retain 
different employees, we provide for whom and under what conditions the utility may 
increase or decrease by CRAM. Finally, we show that there is an increase in the total 
social welfare by utilizing CRAM to the benchmark. 
 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 vii 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 
Dr. Peter J. Coughlan is a research associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) in Monterey, California.  At NPS since 2004, he has taught graduate courses in 
economics and strategic management.  Prior to his arrival at NPS, Dr. Coughlan served 
six years as a professor in the Strategy Unit at the Harvard Business School.  He earned 
his MS and Ph.D degrees in economics from the California Institute of Technology, 
specializing in game theory and behavioral economics, and a bachelor’s degree in 
economics and mathematics from the University of Virginia. 
 
Dr. William R. Gates is the dean of the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
at NPS.  A graduate of Yale University (Ph.D) and University of California, San Diego, 
Dr. Gates has been a professor at NPS since 1988.  Prior to joining NPS, he was an 
economist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory; he has also served as an adjunct professor of 
economics at Golden Gate University and the Monterey Institute of International Studies.  
Dean Gates’ current research focuses on game theory and mechanism design applied to 
both military manpower and acquisition.  
 
Dr. Noah Myung is an assistant professor of finance and economics and the director of 
the Behavioral and Experimental Social Science Laboratory at the Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  He was also a visiting 
faculty at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.  He received 
his Ph.D and MS in economics from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) and 
BS with honors, double majoring in mathematics and economics with a specialization in 
computing from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA).  
 
Myung is a microeconomist with current research interest in market design, particularly 
for the Department of Defense.  He focuses on combinatorial auctions, retention and 
separation bonuses, as well as two-sided matching problems for internal labor markets.  
Myung’s other areas of continued research are in game theory, organizational economics, 
 viii 





Send correspondence to: 
Noah Myung 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 







TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.	   INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1	  
A.	   COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS ....................................................................... 2	  
B.	   APPLICATION TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ..................... 6	  
C.	   OUTLINE .............................................................................................................. 8	  
II.	   THE ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................................ 9	  
A.	   THE RETENTION PROBLEM .......................................................................... 9	  
B.	   EMPLOYEE PREFERENCES ............................................................................ 9	  
C.	   EMPLOYER COSTS ......................................................................................... 10	  
D.	   NMI SURPLUS ................................................................................................... 10	  
III.	   COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM (CRAM) ..... 12	  
A.	   MECHANISM ..................................................................................................... 12	  
B.	   EMPLOYEE BIDS .............................................................................................. 12	  
C.	   EMPLOYEE COST AND RETENTION ......................................................... 13	  
D.	   COMPENSATION FOR RETAINED EMPLOYEES .................................... 14	  
E.	   DIFFERENCES ACROSS RETAINED EMPLOYEES ................................. 15	  
IV.	   OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY .................................................................... 16	  
A.	   OPTIMAL MONETARY BIDDING STRATEGY ......................................... 16	  
B.	   OPTIMAL NON-MONETARY BIDDING STRATEGY ............................... 17	  
C.	   COSTS AND UTILITY UNDER THE OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY 18	  
V.	   BENCHMARK MECHANISM: MONETARY RETENTION AUCTION ...... 19	  
VI.	   EMPLOYER COST .............................................................................................. 20	  
VII.	   EMPLOYEE UTILITY ....................................................................................... 22	  
VIII.	   SOCIAL WELFARE ......................................................................................... 25	  
IX.	   SUMMARY AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .............................. 28	  
APPENDIX A: PROOFS ............................................................................................... 32	  
APPENDIX B: EXAMPLES .......................................................................................... 49	  
LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 53	  























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 xi 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.	   CRAM Example .............................................................................................. xv	  
Table 2.	   Changes in Employee’s Utility by Switching from Monetary Retention 
Auction to CRAM ..................................................................................................... 23	  
Table 3.	   CRAM vs. Monetary Auction Example 1: Optimal Bid and Cost .................. 49	  
Table 4.	   CRAM vs. Monetary Auction Example 1: Utility Comparison ...................... 49	  
Table 5.	   CRAM vs. Monetary Auction Example 2: Optimal Bid and Cost .................. 50	  



























As the Department of Defense (DoD) prepares for austere future budgets, all 
elements of the DoD’s budget face scrutiny. Military pay and benefits represents 
approximately one third of the defense budget. Military compensation is a reasonable 
area to seek savings in defense expenditures.  However, it is critical to maintain service 
member satisfaction given the all-volunteer force and recent increases in operational 
tempo and deployments. 
This report examines an auction (a market mechanism) incorporating 
individualized packages of non-monetary incentives (NMIs) as part of military retention 
packages. While this discussion focuses on retention incentives, the concepts are easily 
extended to other areas of military compensation and to private sector applications. 
Optimizing individual incentive packages eliminates the waste associated with 
undervalued NMIs while providing service members a voice in determining their 
compensation. Furthermore, utilizing a market to determine the proper incentives to pay 
reduces error by estimating the optimal incentive to provide.  
More specifically, the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) is 
developed to improve control in 1) reducing retention cost, 2) accurately retaining the 
proper number of service members, and 3) improving the effectiveness of NMIs. Prior 
research indicated the difficulty of identifying any NMI that has significant value for 
even 50 percent of the service members surveyed, but also showed that approximately 80 
percent of the surveyed service members expressed a significant value for at least one 
NMI. The key to exploiting the potential of incorporating NMIs as part of total 
compensation is personalizing the employees’ NMI packages to reflect their individual 
preferences. If the value of NMI is greater than the cost of providing the NMI, the service 
members will self-select into the NMI. If the value of NMI is less than the cost, then they 
will simply not request the NMI and ask for additional cash compensation.  
CRAM combines monetary compensation with the costs of an individualized set 
of NMIs to create a single total retention cost parameter. CRAM shows the employees 
the possible NMIs available and how much each one will cost. The only information 
CRAM requests from the employee is the set of NMIs he desires and the monetary 
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requirement. CRAM retains the least expensive total cost employees, providing each a 
compensation package with a cost equal to the cost of the first excluded bid (cheapest 
not-retained employee).  
This research explores CRAM’s technical performance. CRAM is never more 
expensive to the employer than strictly monetary compensation, and is generally less 
expensive. CRAM also provides at least as much surplus value as monetary 
compensation, and generally more, where surplus value is the difference between the 
total value of compensation for the retained employees, outside compensation for those 
not retained, and the minimum compensation required to secure the labor services for 
each retained employee. In short, CRAM creates higher value for the society as a whole 
and reduces waste. 
However, employee outcomes under CRAM are more complicated, in part 
because CRAM generally retains different employees than pure monetary compensation. 
In fact, some employees will be better off under CRAM (e.g., those retained under 
CRAM but not with monetary compensation); some employees are better off with 
monetary compensation (e.g., those retained with monetary compensation but not under 
CRAM); some employees are indifferent (e.g., those not retained in either case); some 
employees can be better or worse off depending on how much the first excluded bid 
changes (e.g., those who are retained in both CRAM and monetary compensation). 
We also show that the optimal strategy is for individual employees to select the 
set of NMIs that maximizes their net value (total value less the total provision costs), and 
request a cash premium so that the bid’s total value equals the employee’s opportunity 
cost of employment (the minimum compensation required to accept that job). This has a 
nice characteristic, in that there is no gaming involved for the participants; being truthful 
is the best strategy for the employee. 
We conclude by describing future research plans to verify CRAM’s performance 
and extend this general approach to other areas of military force management. 
 
A SHORT EXAMPLE: Table 1 provides a short example that shows that the 
Department of the Navy (DoN) will save on cost even as total value received by the 
Sailor increases. Additional examples are provided in the technical report.  
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We propose a mechanism called the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
(CRAM), which an organization can utilize to provide both monetary and non-monetary 
incentives (NMIs) for retention. CRAM is a reverse uniform price auction where a single 
employer retains the desired number of employees. The mechanism is simple: CRAM 
elicits employees’ reservation value by asking them how much cash bonus and what set 
of NMIs they require to be retained. The cost of providing the requested cash bonus and 
the set of NMIs is calculated and presented as a single cost parameter. Then, CRAM 
selects the preannounced number of the lowest costing employees to retain. Finally, the 
benefit each retained employee receives is determined by the cost of the first excluded 
employee. In other words, any retained employee receives the set of NMIs and the cash 
bonus he requested. Furthermore, every retained employee receives an additional cash 
bonus that equals the cost of the first excluded employee minus the cost of retaining the 
particular retained employee. Therefore, as with the standard uniform price auction, the 
cost of retaining each employee equals the cost of retaining the first excluded employee. 
CRAM is dominant strategy incentive compatible; it is weakly dominant for every 
employee to reveal their true reservation value by announcing the bonus required and 
selecting a set of NMI that maximizes the difference between the value of NMIs and the 
cost of NMIs. We will work under the retention framework, although CRAM may be 
generalized to designing compensation packages for newly hired employees.  
A general discussion about the combinatorial auction and the application of 
CRAM to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)’s retention problem will be presented 
in the following sections. Readers with sufficient background in either field may choose 
to skip over the particular section.  
Our contributions are as follows: we provide general framework, characterization 
and properties of CRAM. CRAM provides a simple and straightforward way of 
determining the retention cost and the benefits to the employees. This process lessens the 
burden on the auctioneer (the employer), as well as the participants (the employees). We 
provide an optimal bidding strategy for the employee that is dominant strategy incentive 
compatible and show that any optimal bidding strategy must take this form. The 
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employee should reveal their true reservation value, select the set of NMIs that 
maximizes the total surplus, and specify how many dollars he needs to receive in addition 
to NMIs to be retained. The dollar amount plus the value of the NMIs should equal the 
reservation value.  
Next, we show that the cost of retaining employees via CRAM is (weakly) 
cheaper than retaining employees purely by monetary retention auction. This result is 
driven by the fact that CRAM takes advantage of the surplus generated by providing 
NMIs instead of cash.  Because CRAM may retain a different set of individuals 
compared to the monetary auction, with a different cut-off cost, determining whom the 
mechanism benefits is not straightforward. Therefore, we compare an employee’s utility 
under CRAM to the monetary retention auction and show which sets of employees are 
better off and worse off.  
The employees are broken into four sets. An employee not retained under either 
mechanism is indifferent. An employee retained under the monetary retention auction and 
not CRAM is better off under monetary retention auction because he receives higher than 
the reservation utility when retained. Similarly, an employee retained under CRAM but 
not under the monetary retention auction prefers CRAM. For anyone who is retained 
under both mechanisms, he may be better or worse off depending on how much the cutoff 
cost decreases. An employee will be better off under CRAM if the cutoff value does not 
drop more than the gain in surplus from the NMIs.  
Finally, we compare the social welfare, the sum of both retained and not retained 
employees' utility minus employer’s cost, and show that CRAM’s social welfare is 
(weakly) greater than the monetary retention auction. 
A. COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS 
Combinatorial auctions generally deal with bidding on multiple objects. What 
makes combinatorial auctions interesting and difficult is the computational complexity. 
With n  goods introduced, there are  2n −1  possible combinations of goods that the 
auctioneer and the participants may have to consider. Formally, these problems are 
considered to be NP-complete, meaning that typical computers may have a difficult time 
finding an “optimal solution.” 
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While combinatorial auctions have always been of interest, the field has seen the 
greatest growth with the application of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) 
spectrum auctions. Between 1994 and 2003, the FCC has utilized some form of 
combinatorial auction 41 times, which raised over $40 billion in revenue (Kwasnica, 
Ledyard, Porter, and DeMartini 2005).  Even prior to the major utilization by the FCC, 
combinatorial auctions had been utilized to enhance market and non-market transactions 
by public and private entities. Grether, Isaac, and Plott (1981) were one of the earlier 
proposers of using an auction type of design to solve airport time slot allocation problems 
for the FAA. Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin (1982) further improved the use of a computer-
assisted smart market way of solving the landing rights problem. Banks, Olson, Porter, 
Rassenti, and Smith (2003) provided a list of references analyzing various combinatorial 
auctions that have been utilized to solve complicated government and non-government 
allocation problems. These references are: Arizona Energy Exchange for energy trading, 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission study for gas delivery, payload manifest for 
Space Shuttle, resource allocation for Cassini mission to Saturn, train scheduling, 
transportation services, pollution markets, and markets to exchange financial portfolios.  
While we have a pretty good understanding of single-object auctions, 
combinatorial auctions are faced with other problems in addition to computational 
complexity. These include: exposure problem, threshold problem, and winner 
determination problem.1  
Consider a combinatorial auction with three objects, {a} {b} {c}, and four 
participants. An exposure problem occurs when a participant values a combination of a 
good more than the sum of the individual good. If participant 1’s value for {a}, {b}, and 
{ab} are 2, 2, and 6, respectively, and the highest bid for {a} and {b} are currently 2 and 
2, should participant 1 increase his bid for object {a} and {b}? If participant 1 can only 
obtain object {a} and not {b}, then he will end up paying more than 2 for an object he 
only values at 2. Threshold problem occurs when the sum of the smaller bidder’s 
valuation exceeds the larger bidder’s valuation for the package of goods but cannot 
single-handedly outbid the larger bidder.  
                                                
1 Jump bidding: although some may state that jump bidding is a problem, as discussed by Isaac, Salmon, 
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Suppose that participant 1 bids 32 for {abc} and that participants 2, 3, and 4 bid 
10 each for {a}, {b}, and {c}, respectively. Participant 1 should be awarded package 
{abc} and pay 32 for it. On the other hand, if participants 2, 3, and 4 value {a}, {b}, and 
{c} at 11 each, respectively, the revenue maximizing allocation would be to allocate the 
goods to the individuals and charge 11 per good. However, a single individual raising his 
bid to 11 will not change the winner and would require some coordination with the other 
two bidders to change the allocation (though colluding is often not allowed in most 
auction formats).  
Simply put, it is extremely difficult to determine the winner of a combinatorial 
auction. To start with, the highest bid on a single package is not guaranteed to win if 
some alternative combination of bids can generate higher revenue. Finding the alternative 
combination of bids is also not a simple problem. Further problems arise with tie 
breaking rules. How are ties to be broken? Which group of people are winners if different 
combinations of goods by different sets of participants yield the same revenue? What if 
the highest revenue generating combination does not utilize all possible resources? These 
problems can cause lower revenue for the auctioneer and inefficient allocation of 
resources among the participants. Pekeč and Rothkopf (2003) provided an excellent 
overview of combinatorial auctions and its challenges.  
Within the combinatorial auction family, the following are some auction formats 
that have drawn considerable attention:  
1. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMR): Format utilized by the FCC and 
often used as a benchmark comparison to other combinatorial auctions. This 
auction format does not allow for package bidding. 
2. Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM): Developed by Banks, Ledyard, 
and Porter (1989), AUSM allows for package bidding in continuous time.  
3. Resource Allocation Design (RAD): Developed by Kwasnica, at el. (2005), RAD 
is a hybrid of SMR and AUSM plus an additional pricing feature to guide bidders. 
4. Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA): Developed by Porter, Rassenti, Roopnarine, 
and Smith (2003) CCA uses a “clock” as a guide for bidding (similar to an 
English auction). 
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5. Simultaneous Multiple Round Package Bidding (SMRPB): Developed by the 
FCC as a variant of RAD, SMRPB includes the ability to utilize an “exclusive 
OR” function. 
 
The details of each auction are excluded in this paper but references are provided 
for interested readers. Brunner, Goeree, Holt, and Ledyard (2010) summarized some of 
the commonly discussed combinatorial auctions mentioned above and compared their 
performance via experiments. Brunner et al. (2010) found that, when complementarities 
are present, package bidding is recommended and CCA generally yields the highest 
revenue.  
Due to institutional restrictions, utilization of the auctions mentioned above is not 
a straightforward application to the retention framework. The above auction formats are 
called forward auctions and primarily deal with selling objects. Procurement auctions, or 
reverse auctions, are auctions where one is interested in buying goods and services 
instead of selling. Therefore, procurement auctions are closer to retention auctions. There 
are many differences between procurement auctions and retention auctions, however, 
again due to institutional features. One can procure half of the goods and services, or split 
the award among the multiple providers in order to keep the competitors competitive2 
(Chaturvedi, Beil, and Martinez-de-Albeniz 2013). However, in the active-duty military, 
it is not feasible to retain a portion of a person. Furthermore, NMIs are specific incentives 
that are salient for compensating employees but may not be salient in procurement or the 
standard forward auctions. The following section will further discuss some characteristics 
and institutional features that require changes to the known combinatorial auctions and 
the reason for developing CRAM. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the combinatorial auction is also an extremely 
useful tool for aggregating information, as well as endogenously determining a market-
clearing price. When the designer lacks information on which NMIs may or may not be 
sub or super modular, it may be best left for the decision maker to choose the best set of 
his own NMI. When it comes to price formation, instead of exogenously estimating the 
                                                
2 Awarding the procurement to only one vendor may make that vendor a monopoly in the future due to 
technological advancement. 
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price with a large room for error, these auctions will endogenously determine the market-
clearing price. 
B. APPLICATION TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
With over 1.4 million active duty and 1.1 million Reserve and National Guard 
service members in 2013 (DoD 2013), the U.S. military’s labor force is unique because it 
is internally grown. As an example, if an Admiral retires and the Navy is in need of a 
replacement, it cannot simply go to the general labor market and hire a new Admiral. The 
Navy must promote from within. Therefore, the DoD and each of the services must 
carefully plan its force structure over the long term.  
In terms of budget and compensation, approximately 51.4 percent of military 
compensation is cash compensation, while 20.5 percent of military compensation 
involves non-cash items (education, health care, etc.), and 28.1 percent of the 
compensation is deferred compensation (retirement pay accrual, etc.) (DoD 2012). Out of 
the $525 billion budget for the DoD in 2012, $181 billion was related to pay and benefits 
for military personnel (Harrison and Montgomery 2011). With cuts in the defense budget, 
the DoD also needs to find savings in pay and benefits.  
Special and Incentive (S&I) pays are authorized by law to provide the military 
services the flexibility needed for force shaping (OSD Military Compensation 2013). 
There are currently over 60 authorized S&I pays. These pays can be significant. 
Examples include: 1) Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which authorizes the services 
to pay up to $90,000 for a minimum three-year reenlistment; 2) Surface Warfare Officer 
Continuation Pay that authorizes the Navy to pay up to $50,000 to eligible officers for 
committing to a Department Head tour;3 and 3) Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), 
which authorizes up to $200,000 over a service member’s career4 for a skill-specific 
retention. Some S&I pays are much smaller, such as Demolition Duty Pay--a hazardous 
duty, which adds $150 per month for the assignment’s duration. Of course, these S&I 
pays are reserved for very select groups of service members during a shortage of 
manpower. To provide perspective on a service member’s base cash compensation during 
the 2013 calendar year, excluding S&I pays, an average Staff Sergeant in the U.S. Army 
(pay grade E-6) with 10 years of total service and three dependents would get annual cash 
                                                
3 Department Head tour is a type of leadership tour for the Navy’s ship drivers. 
4 U.S. military service members are typically eligible for full retirement at 20 years of service. 
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compensation5 of $60,520.08. An average Captain in the U.S. Marine Corps (pay grade 
O-3) with five years of total service and no dependents would get annual cash 
compensation of $80,107.68 (DFAS 2013). Therefore, these S&I pays can be a 
significant portion of the service member’s cash income. 
The CRAM is designed to support DoD’s retention process. CRAM is developed 
to improve control in 1) reducing retention cost, 2) accurately retaining the proper 
number of service members, and 3) improving the effectiveness of NMIs. The DoD has 
been limited to utilizing a posted-price format for providing the S&I bonuses mentioned 
above, including selective retention bonuses.6 Furthermore, these bonuses are provided as 
purely monetary compensation, thus forgoing any surplus that may be gained by 
including NMIs. Coughlan, Gates, and Myung (2013), CGM henceforth, described the 
additional surplus that the DoD can potentially gain by providing personalized NMIs. 
Furthermore, CGM stressed the importance of utilizing NMIs, the difficulty of providing 
a universal incentive package7 of NMIs, and the variability in preference for NMIs by 
service members between and within communities. CGM found that, although none of 
the NMIs examined provided significant value to at least 50 percent of the service 
members surveyed, approximately 80 percent of the surveyed service members expressed 
a significant value for at least some NMIs.  
As with designing any market, the market designer must consider important 
normative and positive characteristics that the customer values. For example, Pekeč and 
Rothkopf (2003) discussed that some of the key considerations of designing a 
combinatorial auction are allocative efficiency, cost minimization, low transaction cost, 
fairness, failure freeness, and transparency. In addition to the aforementioned 
considerations, our market design for the DoD emphasized the following normative 
characteristics as critical features of a combinatorial auction: 
                                                
5 Cash compensation is the Basic Pay (salary) plus additional cash payments for housing and allowance 
for subsistence. In addition, there are deferred and universal compensation elements, such as health 
insurance and tax advantages, but we do not include these in computing cash compensation. 
6 Posted-price format implies that the Service announces the bonus amount and the market determines 
how many service members accept the announced bonus. This method lacks control over the quantity of 
service members accepting the bonus and can be expensive if too many service members accept.  
7 Universal Incentive Package means that everyone receives the same set of NMIs. 
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1. Egalitarian: perception of equality. The military is of a strong mindset that 
everyone should get the same pay. Meaning, when S&I pay is being used, 
everyone under the specific S&I bonus should get the same bonus.  
2. Dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism: transparency and ease of 
using the mechanism. The military prefers a mechanism that is easy to understand 
and minimizes strategic gaming by the participants.  
3. Low transaction cost: minimum time requirements for auction participants.  This 
consideration is different from many other combinatorial auction designs. Unlike 
the FCC auction, which can take a form of ascending bid auction requiring 
participants to observe and interact for hours or days at a time, this is not feasible 
for the DoD. Different service members may be involved in operational activities 
throughout the world. A submariner may be undersea for an extended period of 
time and only have one chance to submit a single bid. An airman may be 
deployed in a hostile environment and unable to frequently check the current 
auction market status. Therefore, conducting a simultaneous ascending bid or 
clock type auction is not practical.  
Taking these features into consideration, we developed CRAM for the DoD.  
C. OUTLINE 
We describe the general environment for the CRAM auction in Chapter II and 
formally define CRAM in Chapter III. Chapter IV discusses the employee’s optimal 
bidding strategy. Chapter V introduces the monetary retention auction as a benchmark 
against which CRAM’s characteristics are compared. Chapter VI compares the 
employer’s cost under CRAM to the monetary retention auction, while Chapter VII 
compares the employees’ utility, and Chapter VIII compares social welfare. We end with 
conclusions in Chapter IX. 
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II. THE ENVIRONMENT 
A. THE RETENTION PROBLEM 
Let I be a set of employees currently seeking retention with a given employer. 
The employer will retain q I≤  of these employees.  The employer offers its employees 
both a monetary incentive,  m∈R , as well as a set of non-monetary incentives, N. Each 
employee ultimately retained by the employer receives a monetary incentive as well as 
some combination of NMIs as his or her retention package. 
Denote by  S ⊆ N  a subset of NMIs potentially received by any retained 
employee. Each employee can consume at most one of each of the  N  NMIs. Therefore, 
there are 2 N  different potential combinations of NMIs an employee could receive. We 
assume that each NMI is a non-rivalrous but excludable good (thus, each is a club good).  
B. EMPLOYEE PREFERENCES 
Each employee i is endowed with a utility for any combination of a monetary 
incentive  (mi )  and a non-monetary incentive package  (Si ) , given by 
 
Ui mi ,Si( ) = vi Si( ) + mi . We normalize ( ) 0iv ∅ =  for all  i∈I . Note that we explicitly 
allow for an employee’s valuation, ( )i iv S , of any package of non-monetary incentives to 
be additive, sub-additive, super-additive, or some combination thereof. 
Each employee i I∈  is further endowed with a reservation value  ri ∈R , which 
reflects the employee’s opportunity cost of being retained by the employer (or, 
alternatively, the employee’s “willingness-to-retain” or the expected value of the 
employee’s outside offer or opportunity). If not retained by the employer, each employee 
i will enjoy utility ir . Each employee i’s reservation value, ir , and valuation of non-
monetary incentives, iv , are private information. 
We denote the final retention package consisting of cash and a set of NMIs given 
to any retained employee i as  Pi = (mi
*, Si ) . Employee i’s utility for this final retention 
package is then given by  
Ui Pi( ) =Ui mi*, Si( ) = vi Si( ) + mi* . 
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C. EMPLOYER COSTS 
For each individual NMI,  s
n ∈S  ⊆ N , the employer’s cost to provide that NMI to 
any individual employee,  
cost sn( ) , is public knowledge (or at least communicated to all 
employees prior to the retention decision). Because each NMI is a non-rivalrous club 
good, provision of each NMI is characterized by constant marginal cost. Hence, the cost 
to provide any given NMI, ns , to any given number of employees, x, is simply given by 
 
x  cost sn( ) . Hence, there are neither economies nor diseconomies of scale in providing 
any particular NMI. We normalize ( ) 0cost ∅ = . We further assume that there are neither 
economies nor diseconomies of scope in providing any combination of NMIs. That is, the 
total cost to provide any set of NMIs, S, is given by 
 
cost S( ) =
sn∈S
∑cost(sn ) .8 
Therefore, the employer’s total cost to provide a final retention package 
( )*, i i iP m S=  to any retained employee i is given by ( ) ( )*i i icost P m cost S= +  or 






cost P m cost s
∈
= + ∑  
D. NMI SURPLUS 
With this understanding of employee preference and employer cost, it is helpful to 
define the employee NMI surplus. Thus, for any bidder i and any set of NMIs S, let 
( ) ( ) ( ), isurplus i S v S cost S= − . 
Note that, for a given set of NMIs S, 
 
surplus i,S( )∈R , is not necessarily positive. 
The following lemma guarantees, however, that employee NMI surplus will not be 
negative for all sets of NMIs, nor will NMI surplus be positive for all sets of NMIs. 
 
LEMMA 1: For any set of NMIs N and any employee i, 
 
maxS⊆N surplus i,S( )( ) ≥ 0  and 
 
minS⊆N surplus i,S( )( ) ≤ 0 . 
 
                                                
8 We may relax the assumptions of constant marginal cost as well as the economies of scope in providing 
NMI combinations. However, this adds computational complexity without adding value to the introduction 
of our mechanism.  
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With this notion of NMI surplus, it is instructive to note that an employee i’s 
utility for the final retention package can now be written as 
 Ui(Pi ) =Ui(mi
*,Si ) = vi(Si )+ mi
* = mi
* + cost(Si )+ surplus(i,Si ) = cost(Pi )+ surplus(i,Si ) . Hence, 
employee i’s utility for the final retention package is simply the employer’s cost to 
provide that package plus the employee’s NMI surplus. 
Before proceeding, however, it is important to distinguish the notion of NMI 
surplus from total employee surplus (or supplier surplus). Recall that each employee 
 i∈I  has a reservation value  ri ∈R  that reflects the employee’s opportunity cost of being 
retained by the employer. While an employee’s NMI surplus reflects how much that 
employee values a set of NMIs above and beyond the cost of providing those NMIs, 
employee total surplus reflects the utility for a total compensation package above and 
beyond that employee’s reservation value. Hence, total employee surplus is equal to 
( ) ( ) * .i i i i i i iU P r v S m r− = + −  
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III. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM 
(CRAM) 
A. MECHANISM 
We first formally outline the mechanism in this section. Detailed explanation of 
the mechanism will be provided in the subsection to follow. First, define ( , )i i iB m S=  as 
the message or strategy being submitted by the employee to the employer. im  is the 
monetary incentive and iS  is the employee’s requested set of NMIs.  The employer’s cost 
of providing iB  is ( ) ( )i i i ib cost B m cost S= = + . Without loss of generality, let b
* 
represent the 1q +  lowest costing bid, or 1
*
qb b += . The CRAM mechanism 
 Γ = (B1,..., BI ,g())  is a collection of I  bids, 1,..., IB B  and an outcome function 
1 ...: Ig B B X× × → , where the outcome determines the retention and the compensation 
package in the following manner: 
 
Pi =
(m*i ,Si ) if bi < b
*




and retained if *ib b<  
where  mi
* = b* − cost(Si ) . Therefore, persons with *ib b≥  are not retained and receive 
their reservation value.  
B. EMPLOYEE BIDS 
Informally, the CRAM bidding process can be understood as involving two 
decision elements for each employee: (1) selecting NMIs and (2) submitting a minimum 
monetary incentive (or cash compensation) required to retain. 
For the first decision element, employees must choose which NMIs they desire 
from a “menu” in which each NMI has an associated cost. As we will detail below, the 
employer will add the cost of each NMI selected to the employee’s monetary incentive 
request to determine the cost of retaining that employee. Thus, the NMI cost, and not just 
its value to the employee, factors into the employee’s decision regarding which 
combination of NMIs to select from the menu. 
The second decision element of the bidding process involves requesting a 
monetary incentive or cash compensation incentive. Because retained employees receive 
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each and every NMI they chose from the menu as part of the first bidding decision 
element, the monetary incentive bid reflects the minimum cash amount an employee must 
receive in order to retain, conditional on the fact that the retained employee will also 
receive all NMIs selected. 
Thus, the CRAM bidding process can be formally described as follows. Each 
employee i submits a bid of the form ( ),i i iB m S= , where im  is the monetary incentive 
(or cash compensation) and iS  is the combination of NMIs that employee i requests (or 
demands) to be retained. Let B = (B1, B2, …, B|I|) be the set of all submitted employee 
bids. Further, let B-i = (B1, B2, …, Bi-1, Bi+1, …, B|I|) denote the set of bids submitted by all 
employees other than employee i, or employee i’s competing bid set. 
C. EMPLOYEE COST AND RETENTION 
To retain employee i who has submitted bid ( ),i i iB m S= , the employer must 
provide that employee the set of NMIs, iS , and cash compensation of im  (or greater) to 
retain the employee. Thus, the cost to retain that employee is 
( ) ( )i i i ib cost B m cost S= = + . 
The employer will retain the least expensive set of q employees. In other words, 
the employer will retain those q employees who submit the q lowest-cost bids. WLOG, 
let i jb b≤  if i j<  for all ,i j I∈ . The employer will then retain employee i if and only if 
i q≤  or, alternatively, if and only if i qb b≤ . 
Note that a “tie” is possible, in which there exists more than one set of q lowest-
cost bids. Whenever ties occur, multiple employees will have submitted bids that all have 
the qth lowest cost. For simplicity, we assume that ties are not possible. An alternative is 
to break ties randomly.9 However, this implies that only q employees will be retained, 
and therefore some employees who submitted a bid with the qth lowest cost will be 
retained while others who submitted bids of the same cost will not be retained. Note that, 
whenever a tie occurs, we will have (at a minimum) that 1q qb b += . For our purpose, it is 
sufficient to assume that there are no ties between qb  and 1qb + . 
                                                
9 Accepting every tied bid may exceed the employer’s budget constraint and encourage bidder collusion. 
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D. COMPENSATION FOR RETAINED EMPLOYEES 
Because CRAM is a uniform-price auction mechanism, all retained employees 
will receive a total retention (or compensation) package of uniform cost to the employer. 
In particular, each retained employee will receive a retention package whose total cost is 
equal to the cost of the first-excluded bid, which is the lowest-cost bid submitted among 
those employees not retained. But each employee may not receive the same cash 
compensation. 
Given our construction that i jb b≤  if i j< , the first-excluded bid is the bid 
submitted by agent (q+1). We shall refer to the cost of this first-excluded bid as the 
“cutoff cost” and will denote this cost by * 1qb b += . 
Recall that the employer will provide compensation package ( )*, i i iP m S=  to any 
retained employee i, and that the cost of this compensation package is given by 
( ) ( )*i i icost P m cost S= + . Because we have specified that the compensation package for 
any retained employee i must satisfy ( ) *icost P b= , we have that ( )* * i im cost S b+ =  or 
that the cash compensation provided any retained employee i is given by 
( )* * i im b cost S= − . 
Hence, for each i q≤ , employee i’s retention package is given by 
( ) ( )( )* *, ,i i i i iP m S b cost S S= = − . As the following lemma formalizes, it is important to 
recognize that every retained employee receives a monetary incentive greater than or 
equal to the amount requested in their bid. 
 
LEMMA 2: For any employee i retained under CRAM, *i im m≥ . 
 
Moreover, because each employee receives the exact set of NMIs requested, it is 
also the case that every retained employee’s utility for the final retention package 
received will be greater than or equal to their utility for their package bid. 
 
LEMMA 3: For any employee i retained under CRAM, ( ) ( )i i i iU P U B≥ . 
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E. DIFFERENCES ACROSS RETAINED EMPLOYEES 
Although the cost to the employer is exactly the same for every retained 
employee, not every retained employee receives the same compensation package. 
Different employees may have submitted different bids, ( ),i i iB m S= , requesting (and 
ultimately receiving) different NMI combinations. 
Hence, if employees i and j are both retained with ( ),i i iB m S=  and 
( ),j j jB m S= , these employees will receive different NMI packages whenever i iS S≠ . 
Furthermore, if ( ) ( )i jcost S cost S≠ , these two retained employees will also receive 
different cash compensation, with ( )* * i im b cost S= −  and ( )* * j jm b cost S= − . 
Furthermore, even if two retained employees i and j do receive the exact same 
retention package, the utility enjoyed by these two retained employees will not 
necessarily be the same. Suppose we have ( )*, i jP P m S= =  for these two employees; 
they each receive the same cash compensation and same set of NMIs.  But they may 
value these NMIs differently, so they will not necessarily receive the same utility despite 
identical compensation packages. More formally, if ( ) ( )i jv S v S≠ , then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *i i i j j jU P v S m U P v S m= + ≠ = + . 
Finally, even if two retained employees do receive the same utility from their 
respective compensation packages, they do not necessarily enjoy the same total employee 
surplus, because they likely have different reservation values. Formally speaking, even if 
( ) ( )i i j jU P U P= , so long as i jr r≠  we will have ( ) ( )i i i j j jU P r U P r− ≠ −  and, therefore, 
the two employees will receive different employee surpluses. 
In sum, even though the cost of all compensation packages provided to retained 
employees will be the same under CRAM, (1) the NMIs received by retained employees 
may differ, (2) the cash compensation received by retained employees may differ, (3) the 
utility enjoyed by retained employees may differ, and (4) the surplus received by retained 




IV. OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY 
Having fully described the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
(CRAM) and even begun characterizing outcomes under this mechanism, we now turn to 
deriving the optimal bidding strategy for employees under CRAM. We conduct this 
derivation in two stages, first identifying the optimal monetary bidding strategy and then 
identifying the optimal non-monetary bidding strategy. 
A. OPTIMAL MONETARY BIDDING STRATEGY 
To understand an employee’s optimal strategy for the monetary portion ( )im  of a 
CRAM bid, it is helpful to recall that the reservation value ir  reflects employee i ’s 
opportunity cost of being retained by the employer without any of the NMIs the employer 
has offered. Having selected a set of NMIs ( )iS  as part of his CRAM bid, however, 
employee i will receive precisely those NMIs if retained by the employer. 
Therefore, when determining the optimal monetary portion ( )im  of a CRAM bid, 
employee i must consider the revised opportunity cost of being retained with the chosen 
set of NMIs ( )iS . Since these NMIs provide employee i a benefit of ( )i iv S  if retained, 
the revised opportunity cost of being retained is given by ( )'i i i ir r v S= − . In the lemma 
that follows, we show that employee i's optimal bidding strategy involves submitting a 
monetary bid that truthfully reveals this revised opportunity cost. 
 
LEMMA 4: Given any reservation value  ri ∈R , any set of competing bids B-i, and any 
set of NMIs iS N⊆ , employee i's utility under CRAM from bid ( ),i i iB m S=  will be 
maximized if mi satisfies ( )'i i i i im r r v S= = − . 
 
Lemma 4 essentially says that submitting a monetary bid of ( )'i i i i im r r v S= = −  is 
an optimal bidding strategy. With the next lemma, we show that such a monetary bid is, 
in fact, the only optimal bidding strategy. 
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LEMMA 5: Given any reservation value  ri ∈R  and any set of NMIs iS N⊆ , bid 
( ),i i iB m S=  maximizes employee i's utility under CRAM for any set of competing bids, 
B-i, if and only if ( )'i i i i im r r v S= = − . 
 
B. OPTIMAL NON-MONETARY BIDDING STRATEGY 
In the previous sub-section, we demonstrated that the unique optimal monetary 
bid under CRAM is ( )'i i i i im r r v S= = − , for any given set of NMIs iS N⊆ . In this sub-
section, we characterize the optimal non-monetary bidding strategy to accompany the 
now-established optimal monetary bidding strategy. In particular, we show that the 
optimal non-monetary bidding strategy is to select a set of NMIs iS  that maximizes 
employee i’s NMI surplus, which, recall, is given by ( ) ( ) ( ), i i i isurplus i S v S cost S= − . 
 
LEMMA 6: For any reservation value  ri ∈R , submitting bid ( ),i i iB m S=  where 
 
mi = ri − vi Si( )  and  Si ∈argmaxS⊆N surplus i,S( )( )  maximizes employee i's utility under 
CRAM for any set of competing bids B-i. 
 
Lemma 6 essentially says that selecting a set of NMIs iS  that maximizes 
employee i’s NMI surplus while submitting a monetary bid of ( )i i i im r v S= −  is an 
optimal bidding strategy. With our first theorem, we show that this bidding strategy is, in 
fact, the only optimal bidding strategy. 
 
THEOREM 1: Given any reservation value  ri ∈R , bid ( ),i i iB m S=  maximizes 
employee i's utility under CRAM for any set of competing bids, B-i, if and only if 
( )'i i i i im r r v S= = −  and ( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈ . 
 
As for the proof of Theorem 1, the “if” portion of this theorem was already 
covered in Lemma 6 and the “only if” portion of this portion of this theorem was partially 
covered in Lemma 5, with respect to the monetary bid im . Thus, we must only prove the 
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“only if” portion for the NMI bid iS . In other words, we must show that a bid 
( )' ' ',i i iB m S=  with ( )( )' argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∉  and ( )' 'i i i im r v S= −  does not maximize 
utility under CRAM for all sets of competing bids B-i.  
We have now proven that submitting a bid ( ),i i iB m S=  with 
( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈  and ( )i i i im r v S= −  is the unique weakly dominant 
bidding strategy under CRAM. 
C. COSTS AND UTILITY UNDER THE OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY 
Immediately following from Theorem 1, we have two corollaries that characterize 
the equilibrium employee costs-to-retain and retention utility under CRAM. 
 
COROLLARY 1: The cost-to-retain associated with the optimal bid of any employee i 
under CRAM is given by ( )( )max ,i i S Nb r surplus i S⊆= − . 
 
Corollary 1 indicates that, the greater the maximum potential NMI surplus for any 
employee, the lower the employee’s cost-to-retain and the more likely that the employee 
will be retained. 
 
COROLLARY 2: Any employee i who submits the optimal bid under CRAM will 
receive a retention package iP  generating utility ( ) ( )( )* max ,i i S NU P b surplus i S⊆= +  if 
retained. 
 
Corollary 2 indicates that, the greater the maximum potential NMI surplus for any 
employee, the greater the employee’s utility if retained. In combination, these two 
corollaries tell us that, the greater an employee’s maximum NMI surplus, the more likely 
it is that employee will be retained under CRAM and the better off the employee will be 
if, in fact, retained.  
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V. BENCHMARK MECHANISM: MONETARY RETENTION 
AUCTION 
To evaluate the relative performance of the Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism, we must compare CRAM to its logical alternative as a benchmark. In this 
case, the traditional method of motivating retention is to offer a uniform monetary 
incentive to all potential retainees. 
In practice, the amount of any such monetary retention incentive is determined 
using some imperfect estimation method. However, an auction is the most cost-effective 
and welfare maximizing approach to setting a monetary retention incentive (and 
determining which employees to retain). 
Therefore, let us formally describe the logical best alternative to CRAM as a 
monetary retention auction. Furthermore, for consistency, we will consider the uniform-
price auction format. One can consider the monetary retention auction as a subset of 
CRAM, where the set of NMIs  N ={∅} . To distinguish the two auction mechanisms, we 
use the following notations for the monetary retention auction. Consider a monetary 
retention auction in which each employee i submits a single monetary bid ˆ im  and the q 
employees retained by the employer are those who submit the q lowest monetary bids. 
With a uniform-pricing rule, each retained employee receives the same monetary 
retention incentive, which is set equal to the (q+1)th–lowest bid. Let us denote the amount 
of this uniform monetary retention incentive (or, alternatively, the amount of the (q+1)th–
lowest bid) by *mˆ . 
The dominant strategy in a uniform-price monetary retention auction is for each 
bidder to truthfully-reveal their reservation value ri by bidding ˆ i im r= . Thus, each 
retained employee i receives a monetary retention incentive equal to * 1ˆ qm r +=  and enjoys 
a surplus of * 1ˆ i q im r r r+− = − . Further, the total retention cost for the employer is equal to 
*ˆqm . 
In the sections that follow, we will compare CRAM’s performance to the just-
described alternative of a monetary retention auction, considering employer cost, 
employee surplus, and overall social welfare. 
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VI. EMPLOYER COST 
First we compare CRAM’s performance to a monetary retention auction in terms 
of overall employer cost.  
 
LEMMA 7: For any i∈I and any set of NMIs N, the employer’s cost to satisfy employee 
i's optimal bid under CRAM (i.e., the minimum cost to retain employee i) is less than or 
equal to the cost to satisfy employee i's optimal bid under a uniform-price monetary 
retention auction: ˆi ib m≤ . 
 
The above lemma indicates that all employees will submit weakly lower-cost bids 
under CRAM than under a uniform-price monetary retention auction. One can consider 
CRAM as a monetary retention auction with more flexibility, which can therefore 
outperform the monetary auction. More specifically, from the logic of the proof, we can 
say the following: as long as an employee values some NMI (or combination of NMIs) 
greater than the cost to provide that NMI (or those NMIs), the employee will submit a 
strictly lower-cost bid under CRAM than under a uniform-price monetary retention 
auction. An employee will never (optimally) submit a higher-cost bid under CRAM than 
under the monetary auction, and the only scenario in which an employee would submit 
bids of identical cost under each mechanism is when no NMI (or combination of NMIs) 
provides value greater than the cost to provide that NMI (or combination of NMIs). 
Knowing that employees will optimally submit weakly lower-cost bids under 
CRAM than under the monetary retention auction, it is not surprising that the actual total 
retention cost under CRAM is less than the cost under a monetary auction. The following 
Theorem formalizes this result. 
 
THEOREM 2: Given any set of employees I, any number of retainees q I≤ , and any 
set of NMIs N, the cost-per-retainee under CRAM is less than or equal to the cost-per-
retainee under a monetary retention auction. In other words, * *ˆb m≤ . 
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Theorem 2 indicates that CRAM will weakly outperform a uniform-price 
monetary retention auction in terms of minimizing employer cost. While the theorem 
only demonstrates that CRAM will cost no more than the monetary auction in this 
dimension, it is important to note that there are many scenarios in which CRAM will 
strictly outperform the monetary auction in terms of minimizing cost. Example 1 in 
Appendix B illustrates one such scenario. Furthermore, Example 1 illustrates that the 
employees are not necessarily better off under CRAM.  
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VII. EMPLOYEE UTILITY 
In this section, we illustrate that CRAM may increase or decrease employees’ 
utility relative to the benchmark uniform-price monetary auction. Example 1 showed that 
CRAM can produce lower combined employee surplus (40 vs. 60) and utility (160 vs. 
180) than a monetary retention auction. Example 2 of Appendix B demonstrates that the 
opposite may be true. In other words, CRAM may strictly increase total employee utility 
and surplus relative to the benchmark uniform-price monetary retention auction under 
some conditions. 
We now compare the utility level for all the employees under CRAM to the 
monetary retention auction in a general framework. For a given set of NMIs N, 
employees I, and number of retainees  q ≤ I , denote 
*{ | , }iC i i I b b= ∈ <  as the set of 
employees retained under CRAM and *ˆ ˆ{ | , }iM i i I m m= ∈ <  as the set of employees 
retained under the monetary retention auction. There are four possible retention 
conditions:  employees not retained under either CRAM or a monetary auction; 
employees retained under either a monetary auction or CRAM, but not under both; and 
employees retained under both auctions.  We consider all four cases to completely 
contrast employee utility as well as a Pareto-improvement condition.  
First, for employees who are not retained under either mechanism,  i /∈M C , 
they receive their reservation utility, ir , under both auctions. For anyone retained under a 
monetary auction but not retained under CRAM,  i∈M Cc , utility will be lower under 
CRAM than the monetary auction:  Ui(mˆ
*) > ri . Employees not retained under CRAM 
receive their reservation utility, but receive utility greater than their reservation utility if 
retained under a monetary auction. For anyone retained under CRAM but not under a 
monetary auction,  i∈M c C , utility will be higher under CRAM than the monetary 
auction:  Ui(Pi ) > ri . These employees only receive their reservation value under a 
monetary auction, but receive utility greater than their reservation utility under CRAM.  
Finally, consider employees who are retained under both mechanisms,  i∈M C . 
CRAM’s first excluded bid cost is weakly smaller than the monetary auction’s first 
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excluded bid:  b* ≤ mˆ* . Therefore, utility may increase or decrease between CRAM and 
monetary auction for employees retained under both mechanisms. The result is stated in 
the following proposition: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: In order to have a Pareto-improvement for the employees  i∈M C  







surplus(i,S) ≥ mˆ* − b*  with at least one person having 
* *ˆ( , )surplus i S m b> − .  
 
Proposition 1 states that the employees retained under both auctions will do at 
least as well by switching from monetary retention auction to CRAM if the employee 
with the smallest maximum surplus from the NMIs is at least as large as the decrease in 
the first excluded bid. Furthermore, the change would be a Pareto-improvement if at least 
one employee has an NMI surplus greater than the decrease in the first excluded bid. The 
following corollary provides a condition in which there will be a Pareto-improvement for 
all employees and the employer.  
 
COROLLARY 3: If  b* = mˆ* , then C M= . Furthermore, there is a Pareto-improvement 
by all retained employees, unretained employees, and the employer if at least one 
retained employee has ( , ) 0surplus i S > . 
 
Corollary 3 states that if the first excluded CRAM bid equals the first excluded 
monetary retention auction bid, then both mechanisms must retain the same set of 
employees. Furthermore, if at least one of the retained employees has a strictly positive 
value from the NMIs received, this will ensure a Pareto-improvement, not just among a 
subset of people but over all employees (retained and unretained) and the employer.  
Table 2 summarizes the result from this section. By switching from the monetary 
retention auction to CRAM: 
Table 2. Changes in Employee’s Utility by Switching from Monetary Retention 
Auction to CRAM 
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 i∉M C  iU : no change 
 i∈M Cc  iU : decreases 
 i∈M c C  iU : increases 
 i∈M C  iU : can increase 




VIII. SOCIAL WELFARE 
In the previous two sections, we demonstrated that CRAM generates lower 
employer costs than a monetary retention auction, but also that CRAM may generate 
lower employee utility. The critical remaining question, therefore, is whether CRAM 
maximizes social welfare. In particular, are CRAM’s cost savings greater than or equal to 
any reduction in employee utility? In this section, we prove that the answer to this 
question is “Yes.” 
Since we compare social welfare under CRAM to social welfare under the 
monetary retention auction, we will continue to use the notation for people retained under 
CRAM and the monetary retention auction as *{ | , }iC i i I b b= ∈ <  and 
*ˆ ˆ{ | , }iM i i I m m= ∈ < , respectively.  
First, we define social welfare in this environment as total employee utility (both 
retained and unretained) minus total employer costs: Ui (Pi )− b*( )i∈C∑ + ri( )i∈CC∑  for 
CRAM; and Ui (mˆ*)− mˆ*( )i∈M∑ + ri( )i∈MC∑  for the monetary retention auction. This 
definition recognizes that we have explicitly defined utility functions for the employees, 
but we have not done so for the employer. We have only said that the employer’s 
objective is to retain q employees at the lowest possible cost. Therefore, it is natural to 
measure social welfare as utility minus cost in this context. 
To prove that social welfare is higher under CRAM than under a monetary 
retention auction, we compare social welfare for each of the four different sets of 
employees defined above. Our first lemma investigates the set of employees who are 
retained under both CRAM and a monetary retention auction,  i∈M C . 
 
LEMMA 8: For any set of employees I , quantity of retainees q , and set of NMIs N , if 
 i∈M C , then * * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i i iU P b U m m− ≥ −  for  ∀i∈M C . Furthermore, 
 
Ui(Pi )− b*( )i∈MC∑ ≥ Ui(mˆ*)− mˆ*( )i∈MC∑ . 
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Lemma 8 states that social welfare (employee utility minus employer cost) is 
higher under CRAM for any employee retained under both mechanisms. Because this is 
true for each individual employee belonging to the set  i∈M C , it is also true for the 
total social welfare associated with the entire set. This result is different from Proposition 
1 because Lemma 8 states that the value of social welfare is at least as large under 
CRAM as under a monetary retention auction in all cases. 
For the sets C  and  M , it is not necessarily true that the social welfare associated 
with either of these two sets individually is higher under CRAM. On the other hand, the 
following lemma tells that the total social welfare associated with the two sets combined 
is, in fact, higher under CRAM. 
 
LEMMA 9: Suppose  i∈M C C  and  j ∈M C
C . Then, for any I ,  q ≤| I | , and N , 
the social welfare for i ,  j , and the employer are higher under CRAM than under the 
monetary retention auction: 
 
Ui(Pi )− b* + rj ≥U j (mˆ*)− mˆ* + ri . Furthermore, 
 
Ui(Pi )− b*( )i∈M CC∑ + rjj∈MCC∑ ≥ U j (mˆ*)− mˆ*( )j∈MCC∑ + rii∈M CC∑ .  
 
Lemma 9 says that, for any pair of employees, one who is only retained under 
CRAM and one who is only retained under the monetary auction, the total social welfare 
associated with this pair combined will always be higher under CRAM. Because there are 
an equal number of employees who fall into each category (i.e., 
 
M C C = M CC ), 
the entirety of both sets can be broken into such pairs, each of which has higher social 
welfare under CRAM. Consequently, the social welfare associated with the combined set 
of employees belonging to either CRAM only or monetary retention auction only, 
 
M C C( ) M CC( ) , is also higher under CRAM. 
With these two lemmas in place, the following theorem becomes straightforward 
and shows the increase in social efficiency. 
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THEOREM 3: For any I , | |q I≤ , and N , the total social welfare for all employees I  
and the employer is weakly higher under CRAM than monetary retention auction: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )C Ci i i i ii C i C i M i MU P b r U m m r∈ ∈ ∈ ∈− + ≥ − +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
 
Theorem 3 thus indicates that, not only does CRAM reduce employer cost, it also 
increases total social welfare. Hence, while there are some conditions in which CRAM 
might lower employee utility (relative to the monetary retention auction) as stated in 
Section IX, in net, the gain in social welfare outweighs the loss in the welfare. Moreover, 
there are many conditions (such as Example 2 in the previous section) in which CRAM 
will both reduce employer cost and increase employee utility. 
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IX. SUMMARY AND ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Employers often have an opportunity to offer employees non-monetary 
compensation that employees value well in excess of the employer’s cost of provision. 
However, employee preferences across NMIs are diverse.  What is valuable to some has 
little or no value to others. As stated earlier, surveys of military service members 
illustrate the difficulty of identifying any NMI that has significant value for even 50 
percent of the service members surveyed, but also show that approximately 80 percent of 
the surveyed service members expressed a significant value for at least one NMI. These 
surveys show that employers could reduce compensation costs by relying more heavily 
on NMIs. However, the key to exploiting this potential is personalizing the employees’ 
NMI packages to reflect their individual preferences. 
CRAM provides a mechanism to accomplish this objective when setting 
employee retention bonuses, though it can easily be extended to voluntary separation 
incentives and other areas of employee compensation. CRAM is a reverse uniform price 
auction that combines monetary compensation with the costs of an individualized set of 
NMIs to create a single total retention cost parameter. CRAM retains the least expensive 
total cost employees, providing each a compensation package with a cost equal to the 
cost of the first excluded bid.  Each employee receives their requested NMIs and a cash 
bonus equal to the total cost of the first excluded bid minus the total cost of that 
employee’s package of NMIs. 
This paper has demonstrated that CRAM is a dominant strategy incentive 
compatible mechanism. The weakly optimal strategy for any employee is to select the set 
of NMIs that maximize surplus value (the employee’s value minus the total provision 
costs) and include a cash request so that the bid’s total value to the employee equals the 
employee’s reservation value of employment. Compared to a reverse uniform price 
monetary auction, CRAM is never more expensive than the purely monetary 
compensation, and often less expensive. Furthermore, CRAM provides at least as much, 
and often greater, total social welfare compared to a monetary auction. 
However, the employee outcomes under CRAM are more complicated. This is 
most obvious considering that potentially different sets of employees are retained under 
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CRAM and a monetary auction. In fact, some employees will be better off under CRAM, 
including those retained under CRAM but not retained in a monetary auction; some 
employees are better off under a monetary auction, including those retained under a 
monetary auction but not under CRAM; some employees are indifferent, including those 
not retained under either auction; and some may be worse off or better off depending on 
how much the cost of first excluded bid has changed, including those who were obtained 
in both CRAM and monetary auction.  
Considering the expected reduction in employer cost and increase in total social 
welfare, in conjunction with the truth-revealing attributes CRAM offers, CRAM appears 
to be an attractive approach to setting retention compensation in the military personnel 
system, and provides potential for a much broader range of applications. This is 
particularly important when there is an increase in pressure on the military budget. 
Future research will include both simulating CRAM using survey data collected 
from active duty service members (CGM 2013), and conducting experiments to test 
bidding behavior under CRAM. The simulation and experimental data will be used to 
verify CRAM’s attributes and project the potential employer savings, social welfare 
impacts, and impacts on employee utility. 
One concern regarding both the current posted-price military retention process 
and CRAM or a simple monetary auction, observes that all three process retain the least 
expensive employees (most willing to serve or work).  There may be cases where an 
employer would pay a premium to retain higher quality employees or to increase the 
flexibility of the type of employees retained.  Quality Adjusted Uniform Price Auction 
(QUAD) (Myung 2013), is a mechanism developed precisely to control for quality of 
employees retained.  QUAD improves the employer’s ability to control cost and the 
number of employees retained, and also the quality of employees retained while still 
being a dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism.  Myung (2013) argued that, 
for the DoD’s retention and separation problem, there are three important positive 
characteristics that the end user to should be able to control and adjust. These three are 1) 
cost of retention (cost), 2) number of employees being retained (quantity), and 3) quality 
of employees being retained (quality). CRAM can be modified to incorporate a QUAD-
like mechanism process as well. 
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The ultimate goal for our research stream is to integrate market-based processes 
throughout the military personnel system, and apply these mechanisms more broadly as 
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APPENDIX A: PROOFS 
LEMMA 1: For any set of NMIs N and any employee i, ( )( )max , 0S N surplus i S⊆ ≥  and 
( )( )min , 0S N surplus i S⊆ ≤ . 
 
PROOF:  
Note that the set of potential NMI packages, S N⊆ , includes the empty set, ∅ , 
for which ( ) 0iv ∅ =  and ( ) 0cost ∅ = . Therefore, ( ) ( ) ( ), )  0isurplus i v cost∅ = ∅ − ∅ = . 
Thus, it must be the case that ( )( )max , 0S N surplus i S⊆ ≥  and that 
( )( )min , 0S N surplus i S⊆ ≤ . 
 
LEMMA 2: For any employee i retained under CRAM, *i im m≥ . 
 
PROOF:  
Recall that ( )* * i im b cost S= −  and that ( )i i ib m cost S= +  or, in other words, 
( )i i im b cost S= − . Because employee i was retained, we must have * ib b≥ , which implies 
( ) ( )* i i ib cost S b cost S− ≥ −  and, therefore, *i im m≥ . 
 
LEMMA 3: For any employee i retained under CRAM, ( ) ( )i i i iU P U B≥ . 
 
PROOF:  
Recall that ( )*,i i iP m S=  and that ( ),i i iB m S= . Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( )* *, i i i i i i i iU P U m S v S m= = +  and ( ) ( ) ( ), i i i i i i i iU B U m S v S m= = + . In other words, 
( ) ( ) *i i i i i iU P U B m m= + − . Because, as explained in Lemma 2, we have that *i im m≥ , it 
must also be the case that ( ) ( )i i i iU P U B≥ . 
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LEMMA 4: Given any reservation value  ri ∈R , any set of competing bids B-i, and any 
set of NMIs iS N⊆ , employee i's utility under CRAM from bid ( ),i i iB m S=  will be 
maximized if mi satisfies ( )'i i i i im r r v S= = − . 
 
PROOF:  
The proof of this lemma follows the structure of the standard proof for the 
incentive-compatibility of a second-price auction. We demonstrate that, for all possible 
scenarios, employee i can never do better than to submit a bid ( )' ,i i iB r S=  with an 
associated retention cost of ( ) ( )'i i i ib cost B r cost S= = + . 
In each scenario, we explore the implications of submitting an alternative bid 
( )' ',i iB m S=  where ''' im r≠ . Such an alternative bid has an associated retention cost of 
( ) ( )' ' 'i i ib cost B m cost S= = + . 
For each scenario, we explore separately the sub-scenarios where 'im r′ > , where 
'
im r′ < , and where the retention result is either changed or unchanged. 
Scenario 1:  Employee i is retained with a bid of ( )*,i i iB r S=  
Because employee i is retained with a bid of ( )' ,i i iB r S=  in this scenario, we must 
have that *ib b≤ . Furthermore, employee i will receive retention package 
( )( )* ,i i iP b cost S S= −  in this case. Recall that this retention package provides utility 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * *, ,i i i i i i i i iU P U b cost S S v S b cost S b surplus i S= − = + − = + . 
Note that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ,i i i i i i i i ib r cost S r v S cost S r surplus i S= + = − + = −  or that 
( ),i i ir b surplus i S= + . Because * ib b≥ , we thus have 
( ) ( ) ( )* ,  ,i i i i i iU P b surplus i S b surplus i S r= + ≥ + = .  In other words, whenever employee i 
is retained with a bid of ( ) ( )( )' , ,i i i i i i iB r S r v S S= = −  for any set of NMIs Si, it must be 
the case that he is better off (i.e., enjoys greater utility) than if he had not been retained. 
Sub-scenario 1A:  ′m < ri
'  
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With a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′= , employee i will still be retained in this sub-scenario, 
since ( ) ( )' ' *i i i i ib m cost S r cost S b b′= + < + = ≤ . Furthermore, with a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′= , 
employee i also receives the same retention package ( )( )* ,i i iP b cost S S= − , since the set 
of NMIs requested, iS , is the same and the cutoff cost, *b , remains unchanged. Thus, in 
this scenario, employee i cannot do better by submitting a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′=  where 
'
im r′ < . 
Sub-scenario 1B: 'im r′ >  but employee i is still retained with a bid of 
( )' ,i iB m S′= . 
With 'im r′ > , we have that ( ) ( )' 'i i i i ib m cost S r cost S b= + > + =′ . Therefore, 
because the cost of bid 'iB  is higher, employee i may or may not be retained. This sub-
scenario 1B specifies, however, that employee i is still retained with a bid of 
( )' ,i iB m S′= . It must, therefore, be the case that ' *ib b≤ . Hence, with a bid of 'iB , 
employee i also receives the same retention package ( )( )* ,i i iP b cost S S= − , since the set 
of NMIs requested, iS , is the same and the cutoff cost, *b , remains unchanged. Thus, 
employee i cannot do better by submitting a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′=  where 'im r′ >  but 
employee i is still retained with this bid. 
Sub-scenario 1C: 'im r′ >  and employee i is not retained with a bid of 
( )' ,i iB m S′= . 
This sub-scenario 1C specifies that employee i is not retained with a bid of 
( )' ,i iB m S′= . Hence, with a bid of 'iB , employee i will receive only his reservation value 
of ir . With the bid of ( )' ,i i iB r S= , however, employee i is retained and receives utility 
( )i iU P . Because ( )i i iU P r≥ , employee i cannot do better (and could do worse) by 
submitting a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′= , where 'im r′ >  and employee i is not retained with this 
bid. 
Scenario 2: Employee i is not retained with a bid of ( )' ,i i iB r S=  
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Because employee i is not retained with a bid of ( )' ,i i iB r S=  in this scenario, we 
must have that *ib b≥ . Furthermore, employee i will receive only his reservation value of 
ir  in this case. 
Sub-scenario 2A: 'im r′ >  
If 'im r′ > , employee i will not be retained with a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′= , since 
( ) ( )' ' *i i i i ib m cost S r cost S b b′= + > + = ≥ , and he will, therefore, still receive only his 
reservation value of ir . Thus, employee i cannot do better by submitting a bid of 
( )' ,i iB m S′=  where 'im r′ > . 
Sub-scenario 2B: 'im r′ <  but employee i is still not retained with a bid of 
( )' ,i iB m S′= . 
With 'im r′ < , we have that ( ) ( )' 'i i i i ib m cost S r cost S b= + < + =′ . Thus, it is 
possible to have ' *ib b<  and have employee i retained with a bid ( )' ,i iB m S′= . Sub-
scenario 2B specifies, however, that employee i is still not retained with a bid of 
( )' ,i iB m S′= . This means that * 'i ib b b≤ < . Hence, employee i still receives only his 
reservation value of ir . Thus, in this sub-scenario, employee i can once again not do 
better by submitting a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′= . 
Sub-scenario 2C: 'im r′ <  and employee i is retained with a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′= . 
This sub-scenario 2C specifies not only that 'im r′ < , but also that employee i is 
retained with a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′= . This means that ' *i ib b b≤ ≤  (at least one of those 
inequalities must be strict, since 'i ib b< ). With a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′= , employee i would, 
therefore, receive a retention package ( )( )* ,i i iP b cost S S= − , giving utility 
( ) ( )* ,i i iU P b surplus i S= + . As * ib b≤  and ( ),i i ir b surplus i S= + , we have 
( ) ( ) ( )* ,  ,i i i i i iU P b surplus i S b surplus i S r= + ≤ + = .  Thus, employee i will receive less 
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utility (or, at best, the same utility) if he is retained with a bid of ( )' ,i iB m S′=  than if he 
was not retained with a bid of ( )' ,i i iB r S= .   
 
LEMMA 5: Given any reservation value  ri ∈R  and any set of NMIs iS N⊆ , bid 
( ),i i iB m S=  maximizes employee i's utility under CRAM for any set of competing bids, 
B-i, if and only if ( )'i i i i im r r v S= = − . 
 
PROOF:  
The “if” portion of this lemma was already covered in Lemma 4, so we must only 
prove the “only if” part. In other words, we must show that a bid ( )' ' ,i i iB m S=  with 
' '
i im r≠ does not maximize utility under CRAM for any set of competing bids B-i. The 
proof is by contradiction.  
Suppose instead that bid ( )' ' ,i i iB m S=  maximizes employee i's utility under 
CRAM for any reservation value ri and any set of competing bids B-i, but that 
( )' 'i i i i im r r v S≠ = − . Then we can prove this lemma via contradiction if we can find some 
set of competing bids B-i for which bid ( )' ' ,i i iB m S=  does not maximize employee i's 
utility or, more specifically, for which the utility from bid ( ) ( )( )' , ,i i i i i i iB r S r v S S= = −  
exceeds the utility from bid ( )' ' ,i i iB m S= . 
Before proceeding, note that the cost of bid ( )' ' ,i i iB m S=  is given by 
( )' 'i i ib m cost S= + , while the cost of bid ( )' ,i i iB r S=  is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ,i i i i i i i i ib r cost S r v S cost S r surplus i S= + = − + = − .  We will continue to denote 
the “cutoff cost” by *b . 
There are two scenarios to consider. 
Scenario 1: ' 'i im r>   
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In this scenario, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' ' i i i i i i i i i ib m cost S r cost S r v S cost S b= + > + = − + = . Thus, consider some set of 
competing bids B-i such that ' *i ib b b> > . In that case, with bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S=  employee i 
would not be retained and would, therefore, receive only his reservation value ir . In 
contrast, with bid ( )' ,i i iB r S=  employee i would be retained and receive retention 
package ( )( )* ,i i iP b cost S S= −  , giving utility 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *, i i i i i i i iU P U b cost S S v S b cost S= − = + − . Because * ib b> , we have 
( ) ( )* i i i ib r v S cost S> − +  or ( ) ( )* i i i ib cost S r v S− > − . 
Therefore, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* i i i i i i i i i i iU P v S b cost S v S r v S r= + − > + − =  or ( )i i iU P r> . Hence, 
the utility from bid ( ) ( )( )' , ,i i i i i i iB r S r v S S= = −  exceeds the utility from bid 
( )' ' ,i i iB m S= , yielding the contradiction. 
Scenario 2: ' 'i im r<  
In this scenario, we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' ' i i i i i i i i i ib m cost S r cost S r v S cost S b= + < + = − + = . Thus, consider some set of 
competing bids B-i such that ' *i ib b b< < . In that case, with bid ( )' ' ,i i iB m S=  employee i 
would be retained and would, therefore, receive retention package 
( )( )* ,i i iP b cost S S= − , thus providing utility 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *, i i i i i i i iU P U b cost S S v S b cost S= − = + − . In contrast, with bid ( )' ,i i iB r S=  
employee i would not be retained and would receive his reservation value ir . Because 
*
ib b< , we have ( ) ( )* i i i ib r v S cost S< − +  or ( ) ( )* i i i ib cost S r v S− < − . 
Therefore, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* i i i i i i i i i i iU P v S b cost S v S r v S r= + − < + − =  or ( )i i iU P r< . Hence, 
the utility from bid ( ) ( )( )' , ,i i i i i i iB r S r v S S= = −  exceeds the utility from bid 
( )' ' ,i i iB m S= , once again yielding a contradiction. 
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Thus, for any ( )' 'i i i i im r r v S≠ = − , it cannot be the case that bid ( )' ' ,i i iB m S=  
maximizes employee i's utility under CRAM for any reservation value ri and any set of 
competing bids B-i.  
 
LEMMA 6: For any reservation value  ri ∈R , submitting bid ( ),i i iB m S=  where 
( )i i i im r v S= −  and ( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈  maximizes employee i's utility under 
CRAM for any set of competing bids B-i. 
 
PROOF:  
From Lemmas 4 and 5, we already know that submitting a monetary bid of 
( )i i i im r v S= −  maximizes employee i's utility given any set of NMIs iS . Thus, we must 
only prove that selecting a set of NMIs iS , with ( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈  in 
conjunction with such a  monetary bid maximizes employee i's utility under CRAM. 
Once again, let * 1qb b +=  be the cutoff cost and 
( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i i ib m cost S r v S cost S= + = − +  be the cost of bid ( ),i i iB m S= . There are two 
scenarios to consider. 
Scenario 1: Employee i is retained with bid ( ),i i iB m S= . 
Since employee i is retained, his compensation package will be 
( ) ( )( )* *, ,i i i i iP m S b cost S S= = − , which provides utility of ( ) ( ) *i i i i iU P v S m= + . First, 
note that whenever an employee submits a monetary bid of ( )i i i im r v S= −  for any set of 
NMIs iS , his utility from being retained with such a bid will always match or exceed his 
utility from not being retained. This is because (using Lemma 2) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*i i i i i i i i i i i i i iU P v S m v S m v S r v S r= + ≥ + = + − = . Thus, employee i must simply 
choose iS  to maximize ( )i iU P  in this scenario. Because *b  is independent of the non-
monetary bid iS  (and independent of monetary bid im  as well), employee i maximizes 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * *,i i i i i i i i iU P v S m v S cost S b surplus i S b= + = − + = +  if, and only if, he chooses 
iS  where ( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈ . 
Scenario 2: Employee i is not retained with bid ( ),i i iB m S= . 
Since employee i is not retained with bid ( ),i i iB m S= , we know that *ib b≥  and 
that employee i will receive his reservation value ir . Proceeding to prove by 
contradiction, suppose there exists an alternative bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S= , with 
( )( )' argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∉  and cost ( )' ' 'i i ib m cost S= + , which yields utility greater 
than ir  in this scenario. First of all, from Lemma 5, we know that utility from bid 
( )' ' ',i i iB m S=  is maximized if, and only if, ( )' 'i i i im r v S= − , so we can assume this to be 
true of 'im . Now, if 
' *
ib b> , employee i will still not be retained with bid 
'
iB  and will still 
only receive his reservation value ir . Therefore, for bid '  iB to yield utility greater than ir , 




' + cost Si
'( ) = ri − vi Si'( ) + cost Si'( )  
 
= ri − surplus i,Si'( ) > ri − surplus i,Si'( ) = ri − vi Si( ) + cost(Si )   = mi + cost Si( ) = bi ≥ b* . 
Hence, ' *ib b> , which is a contradiction. 
Hence, bid ( ),i i iB m S=  where ( )i i i im r v S= −  and 
( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈  maximizes employee i's utility under CRAM for any set 
of competing bids B-i. 
 
THEOREM 1: Given any reservation value  ri ∈R , bid ( ),i i iB m S=  maximizes 
employee i's utility under CRAM for any set of competing bids, B-i, if and only if 




The “if” portion of this theorem was already covered in Lemma 6 and the “only 
if” portion of this theorem was partially covered in Lemma 5 with respect to the 
monetary bid im . Thus, we must only prove the “only if” part for the NMI bid iS . In 
other words, we must show that a bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S=  with ( )( )' argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∉  
and ( )' 'i i i im r v S= −  does not maximize utility under CRAM for all sets of competing bids 
B-i. 
In other words, we can prove this theorem if we can find some set of competing 
bids B-i for which any bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S= , with ( )( )' argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∉  and 
( )' 'i i i im r v S= − , does not maximize employee i's utility. More specifically, we will show 
that, for any such bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S= , there exists a cutoff cost *b  such that the utility from 
bid ( ),i i iB m S=  with ( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈  and ( )i i i im r v S= −  exceeds the 
utility from bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S= . 




' + cost Si
'( ) = ri − vi Si'( ) + cost Si'( ) = ri − surplus i,Si'( ) , while the cost of 
( ),i i iB m S=  is given by  bi = mi + cost Si( ) = ri − vi Si( ) + cost Si( )  = ri − surplus i,Si( ) . 
Because ( ) ( )', ,i isurplus i S surplus i S< , we have 
 
bi
' = ri − surplus i,Si'( ) > ri − surplus i,Si( ) = bi  or 'i ib b> . 
Therefore, there exists some set of competing bids B-i such that ' *i ib b b> > , 
meaning that employee i would not be retained with bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S= , but would be 
retained with bid ( ),i i iB m S= . Thus, with bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S= , employee i would simply 
receive his reservation value ir . With bid ( ),i i iB m S= , on the other hand, he would 
receive compensation package ( ) ( )( )* *, ,i i i i iP m S b cost S S= = − , which provides utility of 
 Ui(Pi ) = vi(Si )+ mi
* = vi(Si )+ b*−cost(Si )  > vi(Si )+ bi − cost(Si )  = vi(Si )+ mi
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 = vi(Si )+ ri − vi(Si ) = ri  meaning ( )i i iU P r> . Hence, the utility from bid ( ),i i iB m S=  
exceeds the utility from bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S= . 
As further proof, consider a set of competing bids B-i such that * 'i ib b b> > , under 
which employee i would be retained with either bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S=  or bid ( ),i i iB m S= . 
With bid ( ),i i iB m S= , employee i would, therefore, receive compensation package 
( )( )* ,i i iP b cost S S= − , which provides utility of 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *,i i i i i iU P v S b cost S surplus i S b= + − = + . With bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S= , employee i 
would receive compensation package ( )( )' * ' ',i i iP b cost S S= − , which provides utility of 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' ' * ' ' *,i i i i i iU P v S b cost S surplus i S b= + − = + . Because 
( ) ( )', ,i isurplus i S surplus i S< , we have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* ' * ', ,i i i i i iU P surplus i S b surplus i S b U P= + > + = . Hence, the utility from bid 
( ),i i iB m S=  exceeds the utility from bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S=  under this set of competing bids. 
In sum, bid ( )' ' ',i i iB m S=  with ( )( )' argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∉  and ( )' 'i i i im r v S= −  
does not maximize utility under CRAM for all sets of competing bids B-i.  
 
COROLLARY 1: The cost-to-retain associated with the optimal bid of any employee i 
under CRAM is given by ( )( )max ,i i S Nb r surplus i S⊆= − . 
 
PROOF:  
Recall that the cost-to-retain associated with a bid ( ),i i iB m S=  from employee i 
is given by ( )i i ib m cost S= + . If this bid includes the optimal monetary bid of 
( )i i i im r v S= − , this cost becomes ( ) ( ) ( ),i i i i i i ib r v S cost S r surplus i S= − + = − . Finally, 
if employee i also selects the optimal set of NMIs, such that 
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( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈ , then the cost-to-retain associated with bid ( ),i i iB m S=  
becomes ( )( )max ,i i S Nb r surplus i S⊆= − . 
 
COROLLARY 2: Any employee i who submits the optimal bid under CRAM will 




If retained with a bid of ( ),i i iB m S=  under CRAM, recall that employee i will 
receive retention package ( )( )* ,i i iP b cost S S= − , which provides utility of 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * ,i i i i i iU P b cost S v S b surplus i S= − + = + . If employee i has selected the optimal 
set of NMIs, such that ( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈ , then this utility becomes 
( ) ( )( )* max ,i i S NU P b surplus i S⊆= + .  
 
LEMMA 7: For any i∈I and any set of NMIs N, the employer’s cost to satisfy employee 
i's optimal bid under CRAM (i.e., the minimum cost to retain employee i) is less than or 
equal to the cost to satisfy employee i's optimal bid under a uniform-price monetary 
retention auction: ˆi ib m≤ . 
 
PROOF:  
As described in the previous section, under a uniform-price monetary retention 
auction, it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to truthfully reveal his or her reservation 
value ri by bidding ˆ i im r= . Thus, the minimum cost to retain employee i under this 
monetary retention auction is equal to ir .  
Under CRAM, on the other hand, we know (from Theorem 1) that the unique 
weakly dominant bidding strategy is for employee i to submit a bid ( ),i i iB m S=  with 
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( )( )argmax ,i S NS surplus i S⊆∈  and ( )i i i im r v S= − . Thus, the cost of employee i’s 
optimal bid under CRAM is equal to 
 bi = mi + cost(Si )  = ri − vi(Si )+ cost(Si )  = ri − surplus(i,Si )  = ri −maxS⊆N (surplus(i,S)) . 
From Lemma 1, however, we know that ( )( )max , 0S N surplus i S⊆ ≥ . Therefore, 
( )( )max ,i i S N ib r surplus i S r⊆= − ≤ . Hence, for any employee i, the employer’s cost to 
satisfy his optimal bid under CRAM is less than or equal to the cost to satisfy his optimal 
bid under a uniform-price monetary retention auction. 
 
THEOREM 2: Given any set of employees I, any number of retainees q I≤ , and any 
set of NMIs N, the cost-per-retainee under CRAM is less than or equal to the cost-per-
retainee under a monetary retention auction. In other words, * *ˆb m≤ . 
 
PROOF:  
Lemma 7 tells us that the cost of employee i’s optimal CRAM bid is less than or 
equal to the cost of his optimal uniform-price monetary auction bid. In other words, for 
all i∈I, ˆi i ib m r≤ = . Therefore, the lowest-cost bid under CRAM must cost less than (or 
the same as) the lowest-cost bid under the monetary auction, the highest-cost bid under 
CRAM must cost less than (or the same as) the highest-cost bid under the monetary 
auction, and the nth lowest-cost bid under CRAM must cost less than (or the same as) the 
nth lowest-cost bid under the monetary auction for any n I≤ . Therefore, the cutoff cost 
*b , which is equal to the cost of the (q+1)th lowest-cost bid under CRAM, must be less 
than *mˆ , which is the cost of the (q+1)th lowest-cost bid under the monetary auction.  
 
PROPOSITION 1: In order to have a Pareto-improvement for the employees  i∈M C  







surplus(i,S) ≥ mˆ* − b*  with at least one person having 




Recall that by Lemma 7, ˆi ib m≤ , and by theorem 2, * *ˆb m≤ . For i∈M C , 
utility under CRAM is 
* *( ) ( ) max ( , )i i i i i S NU P m v S b surplus i S⊆= + = +  and utility under 
monetary auction is * *ˆ ˆ( )iU m m= . In order for 
*ˆ( ) ( )i i iU P U m≥ , it must be that 
* *ˆmax ( , )
S N
surplus i S m b
⊆






surplus(i,S) ≥ mˆ* − b*
  
, with at least one person 
having * *ˆ( , )surplus i S m b> − for some S N⊆ , then *ˆ( ) ( )i i iU P U m≥  for all i , and 
*ˆ( ) ( )i i iU P U m>  for some i . 
 
COROLLARY 3: If ** ˆb m=  then C M= . Furthermore, there is a Pareto-improvement 
by all retained employees, unretained employees, and the employer if at least one 
retained employee has ( , ) 0surplus i S > . 
 
PROOF:  
By Lemma 7, ˆi ib m≤ . If  b* = mˆ* , and the employer only retains q  people, in 
order for C M≠ , there must be at least one employee, j , who was retained under the 
monetary auction but not under CRAM. This means that * jb b≤  and *ˆ ˆjm m< , which 
implies ** ˆ ˆjjb mb m≤ <≤ . But  ** ˆb m=  so, therefore, it is not possible and C M= .  
Now, to show that there is a Pareto-improvement: given that C M= , it must be 
that c cC M= . The individuals not retained always receive their reservation value ir  in 
either mechanism. As for the employer, in both mechanisms, it will cost ** ˆb m=  to retain 
each of the q  employees in either mechanism. So for the unretained and the employer, 
they are equally as well off under either mechanism. Finally, as for the i C M∈ = , these 
individuals were retained under both mechanisms. Since the change in cutoff value 
* *ˆ 0m b− = , then * *ˆmax ( , ) 0
S N
surplus i S m b
⊆
≥ = −  for i∀ , by Lemma 1 and given that least 
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one retained employee has ( , ) 0surplus i S > , we satisfy the condition for the Proposition 
1 and there is a Pareto-improvement among C . Therefore, in sum  C C
C = I  and the 
employer, there is a weak Pareto-improvement.  
 
LEMMA 8: For any set of employees I , quantity of retainees q , and set of NMIs N , if 
 i∈M C , then * * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i i iU P b U m m− ≥ −  for  ∀i∈M C . Furthermore, 
 
Ui(Pi )− b*( )i∈MC∑ ≥ Ui(mˆ*)− mˆ*( )i∈MC∑ . 
 
PROOF:  
Under CRAM, the surplus for employee i in equilibrium is 
*( )i iU P b− = * *max ( ( , )) max ( ( , ))S N S Nb surplus i S b surplus i S⊆ ⊆+ − = . From Lemma 1, 
max ( ( , )) 0S N surplus i S⊆ ≥ . Under monetary retention auction, the surplus for employee i 
in equilibrium is * * * *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) 0iU m m m m− = − = . Therefore, * * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i i iU P b U m m− ≥ − . Finally, 
 
(Ui(Pi )− b*) ≥ (Ui(mˆ*)− mˆ*)i∈MC∑i∈MC∑  is true since * * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i i iU P b U m m− ≥ −  for 
 ∀i∈M C . 
 
LEMMA 9: Suppose  i∈M C C  and  j ∈M C
C . Then, for any I , | |q I≤ , and N , 
the social welfare for i , j , and the employer are higher under CRAM than under the 
monetary retention auction: * * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i i j j iU P b r U m m r− + ≥ − + . Further, 
 
Ui(Pi )− b*( )i∈M CC∑ + rjj∈MCC∑ ≥ U j (mˆ*)− mˆ*( )j∈MCC∑ + rii∈M CC∑ .  
 
PROOF:  
Under CRAM, employee i is retained while employee j is not. Therefore, 
employee i receives a retention package iP , generating utility 
( ) ( )( )* max , ,i i S NU P b surplus i S⊆= +  while employee j receives his reservation value jr . 
At the same time, the employer’s cost to retain employee i is equal to *b . Thus, under 
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CRAM, the combined utility minus employer cost is equal to 
( )( ) ( )( )* *max , max ,S N j S N jb surplus i S r b surplus i S r⊆ ⊆+ + − = + . 
Meanwhile, employee j is retained under the monetary retention auction while 
employee i is not. Therefore, employee j receives the uniform monetary retention 
incentive of *mˆ  while employee i receives his reservation value ir . At the same time, the 
employer’s cost to retain employee j is equal to *mˆ . Thus, under the monetary retention 
auction, the combined utility minus employer cost is equal to * *ˆ ˆi im r m r+ − = . 
Hence, to prove this proposition, we must show that 
( )( )max ,S N j isurplus i S r r⊆ + ≥ . 
To show this to be true, note that employee i is retained under CRAM while 
employee j is not, so it must be the case that ( )( )* max ,i i S Nb b r surplus i S⊆≥ = −  and that 
( )( )* max ,j j S Nb b r surplus j S⊆≤ = − . Putting these two inequalities together, we have that 
( )( ) ( )( )max , max ,i S N j S Nr surplus i S r surplus j S⊆ ⊆− ≤ −  or that 
( )( ) ( )( )max , max , .S N j i S Nsurplus i S r r surplus j S⊆ ⊆+ ≥ +  
By Lemma 1, however, we know that ( )( )max , 0S N surplus i S⊆ ≥ . Thus, our 
previous inequality implies ( )( )max ,S N j isurplus i S r r⊆ + ≥ , which demonstrates the first 
part of the proposition to be true.  
For total social welfare, we know from the former part of the proof that for each 
unique match of i  and j , * * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i i j j iU P b r U m m r− + ≥ − + . Because 
 
M c C = M Cc , we can match each unique i  to a unique j , thus, there are an equal 
number of elements between 
 
(Ui(Pi )− b*)+ rjj∈MCC∑i∈M CC∑  and 
 
U j (mˆ
*)− mˆ*( )j∈MCC∑ + rii∈M CC∑ . Therefore,  
 
Ui(Pi )− b*( )i∈M CC∑ + rjj∈MCC∑ ≥ U j (mˆ*)− mˆ*( )j∈MCC∑ + rii∈M CC∑ .  
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THEOREM 3: For any I , q I≤ , and N , the total social welfare for all employees I  
and the employer is weakly higher under CRAM than monetary retention auction: 
( ) ( )* * *ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )C Ci i i i ii C i C i M i MU P b r U m m r∈ ∈ ∈ ∈− + ≥ − +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
 
PROOF:  
 Lemma 8 demonstrated that the total social welfare associated with the set 
 M C  is the same or greater under CRAM as under the monetary retention auction. 
Similarly, Lemma 9 demonstrated that total social welfare associated with the combined 
set 
  
( M C C) ( M CC )
 
is the same or greater under CRAM as under the monetary 
retention auction. Finally, because employees belonging to the set   M
C CC  are not 
retained under either mechanism and receive only their reservation value, the social 
welfare associated with these employees is the same under each mechanism. Thus, total 
social welfare associated with the entire set of employees, 
 I = ( M C) ( M
C C) ( M CC ) ( M C CC )   = C C
C = M  M C , is the same or 
greater under CRAM as under the uniform-price monetary retention auction: 
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APPENDIX B: EXAMPLES 
Example 1: Comparing CRAM to Monetary Retention Auction 
Suppose there are three employees, such that 3I =  and { }1,2,3I = , and that two 
of these employees are to be retained (i.e., q = 2). Further, suppose that there is only a 
single NMI offered under CRAM, such that 1N =  and { }N s= , and that this NMI can 
be provided at a constant marginal cost of 10 ( )( )i.e.,  10cost s = . 
Finally, suppose that each employee’s reservation value (ri) and value for the 
NMI offered are as indicated in columns two and three of Table 3. Under these 
conditions, the remaining columns of Table 3 indicate the optimal NMI choice, resulting 
NMI surplus, optimal CRAM monetary bid, and resulting CRAM bid cost for each 
employee. 
 






















1 20 0 ∅ 0 20 20 
2 40 0 ∅ 0 40 40 
3 60 20 s 10 40 50 
 
Because q = 2, we have * 1 3 50qb b b+= = =  under CRAM. Similarly, we have 
*
1 3ˆ 60qm r r+= = =  under the uniform monetary retention auction. Thus, 
* *ˆb m<  and the 
cost-per-retainee under CRAM is strictly less than the cost-per-retainee under a monetary 
retention auction in this example. 
To further understand how the outcome in this example would differ under 
CRAM relative to a monetary retention auction, consider Table 4, which details the 
retention decision, utility, and surplus for each employee under the monetary auction and 
under CRAM. 
























1 Yes 60 40 Yes 50 30 
2 Yes 60 20 Yes 50 10 
3 No 60 0 No 60 - 
TOTAL - 180 60 - 160 40 
 
Note that the employer is strictly better off under CRAM in this example, but 
every employee is not better off. In fact, employees 1 and 2 enjoy greater utility and 
surplus under the monetary retention auction in this example. 
 
Example 2: Comparing CRAM to Monetary Retention Auction with an increase in 
employee’s utility 
Suppose the same situation as in Example 1, but the employees’ NMI values have 
changed as now summarized in Table 5. 
 
 






















1 20 20 s 10 0 10 
2 40 20 s 10 20 30 
3 60 20 s 10 40 50 
 
Because q = 2, we once again have * 1 3 50qb b b+= = =  under CRAM and 
*
1 3ˆ 60qm r r+= = =  under the uniform monetary retention auction. Table 6 details the 
retention decision, utility, and surplus for each employee under the monetary auction and 
under CRAM for this example. 
























1 Yes 60 40 Yes 70 50 
2 Yes 60 20 Yes 70 30 
3 No 60 0 No 60 - 
TOTAL - 180 60 - 200 80 
 
CRAM once again generates lower employer costs in this example, but it also 
produces a higher total employee surplus (80 vs. 60) and utility (200 vs. 180) than under 
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